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Try Republic’s Soul:
The Critical Period from 1781 to 1789
洛之秋
In December 1776 when American cause seemed lost, and Washington’s troops we
re in full retreat across New Jersey, Thomas Paine in The American Crisis vo
iced out his classic motto---“these are the times that try men’s souls.”
However, when the victorious colonies resumed peace in 1783, another social
and political crisis that as well threatened the very survival of the young
republic had already set in. It has a special term, “the Critical Period”
, which was firstly used by John Faithsck in 1888.
Over the past two centuries, few historians on the era of the American Revol
ution have failed to appreciate the importance of the former ordeal (1776-17
83). What has been less appreciated, and to some extent imperfectly understo
od, however, is the latter one, especially on its causes and nature. As a ma
tter of fact, the Critical Period is a historic moment in American history t
hat more tried the nation’s soul than the winter in Valley Forge. It is par
tly because that, for the most time of 1780s, the United States was in face
of a disastrous turmoil not only in regard of sociology by of ideology. More
importantly, it is because the young republic pulled through from the fatef
ul trail and bestowed republicanism with an initiative interpretation and ou
tlook.
The Critical Period, first of all, derived from an economic and diplomatic c
risis, and generally speaking, was the byproduct of the epic-like Revolution
. Glorious as victory seemed, the War was still hugely bloody, devastating,
and costly. James F. Willis and Maritain Primack estimates the war fees amou
nted to $135 million. And French’s help was not free at all. The Congress
had to borrow additional money abroad simply to pay the accumulating interes
t of national debt, which probably stood at about $35 million. Like other p
ostwar time in the world, the country was inflicted by orphans, widows, bank
rupts, homeless beggars, and disgruntled soldiers who refused to disband unl
ess got payment. Without the protection of mercantilism by London, overseas,
especially export, dramatically shrank. Since the local manufacture was far
from developed yet, British goods surged in by some but illegal means. More
ironically, the Congress, confined by the Articles of Confederation, neithe
r had the power to enlarge revenue through taxation nor could gain the neces
sary nine votes of approval of imposing federal tariffs. The incoming of the
Congress was at the mercy of the States, who were always declined to show t
heir generosity. In order to raise fund, the Confederation government had on
ly two choices. One was printing more paper money, but at a price of currenc
y depreciation. As a result, the exchange rate between hard currency and pap
er money inflated from 1:1.5 in 1776 to 1:147.97 in 1781. The other choice
was selling public land in the west, but at expense of buying diplomatic imp
asse.
The diplomatic crisis was an inevitable consequence of Domino Theory happeni
ng in the United States. The Northwest Ordinance that encouraged western set
tlement ignited the fury of the Indians of the region, who insisted the natu
ral ownership of this land. British, the humiliated loser in the Independenc
e War, of course, were willing to back Indian’s military resistance to the
expansion of their enemy across the Ohio River. Spain, the wartime ally, who
in possession of Florida, also worried the westward settlement of American
and closed the outlet of the Mississippi River at New Orleans to American sh
ipping in June 1784, it was a bitter blow to the frontiers, who still counte
d on developing overseas trade via Mississippi. More disappointing, John Jay
, the successful negotiator in Paris in1783 this time failed in reaching any
satisfactory compromise with Spain.
Shays’s Rebellion in 1786, the boiling point of the Critical Period, made m
ore people convinced of the very existence of the crisis. In the same year o
f the farmers’ revolt, even originally optimistic George Washington began t
o warn the nation: “I predict the worst consequence from a half-starved lim
ping government, always moving upon crutches and tottering at every step.”
Apparently, all the Critical Period could be put down to the contemporary ec
onomic depression and the ensuing diplomatic impasse. Charles A. Beard in An
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution also stressed the decisive role
of economic interest in the process that finally led to the Constitutional
Convention. However, that is hardly the point. It is not simply that a nati
on got frustrated in the first year of its history, and the discredited gove
rnment showed little competence to deal with the problems. It is rather that
how far the United States would go suppose the fabric of the authority syst
em and the stereotyped understanding of the nature of the republic continual
ly kept unchanged. This political consideration is a deeper phase of the und
erstanding of the crisis and is closest to the essence.
The United States, like a beacon lighting the monarchical Europe, was a utop
ia new form of nation that had never existed before. The basic political pri
nciples of the country were drawn from the Enlightenment and heavily affecte
d by Locke’s and Montesquieu’s ideas concerning the separation of executiv
e, judicial, and legislative function. These theorists also had some other a
rguments that contributed to the cornerstone of the nation-building. For exa
mple, Montesquieu, in The Spirit of Laws, claimed that republicanism could o
nly apply to small country. The ancient Greek republics were built but by th
e unit of individual cities. To run a vast country, like the United States,
men had to resort to a highly centralized government, which in Montesquieu’
s view was equal to despotism. Locke and Thomas Paine set civil society aga
inst government, and believed “Government is pernicious, the source of thre
ats to individual freedom…[and] is in essence tyrannical.”
The Articles of Confederation, completed by the Congress in 1778 and ratifie
d by the States three years later, just reflected such a republican idealism
. The United States was created as a loose league. The central government ha
d no right to levy tax or regulate trade. Important decisions required the a
ssent of nine states; amendment to the Article needed the unanimous approval
of thirteen states. The major tasks of governing were left to the represent
ative governments. Th Articles was successful in preventing the abuse of pow
er, but not the abuse of democracy. Thus the Confederation government as a w
hole was totally defective and unworkable. Separatism---the colonial traditi
on that helped the nation to earn independence---continued to erode the unit
y of the States. Many dissidents plead for separating from their own communi
ty, just like Rhode Island did decades ago. Patriotism, at that time, was, a
nd many thought it should be, more in terms of mother-states rather than of
mother-nation. In The National Experience, Daniel Boorstin notices a convent
ionally overlooked detail: long after the Declaration of Independence, when
the founding fathers, such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, referred to the
name of the new nation, the United States was grammatically regarded as plur
al instead of singular. Nothing could be more embarrassing for a nation tha
t frees from nationalism. Experimenting confederation at the expense of nati
on's disintegration was far from cost-efficient.
Responding to the above causes of the Critical Period, its nature was, in es
sence, the controversy over a basic issue: how to establish a better form fo
r the republic other than confederation. Federalists, represented by Alexand
er Hamilton and James Madison, had their answer. Having an insightful interp
retation of the serious crisis, they pressed for a reconsideration of confed
eration in this country. Though it's unlikely that all the fifty-five delega
tes (maybe Hamilton was an exception) from the twelve states all had a prepa
red layout for the future of the disordered nation when they met in Philadel
phia in 1787, they were fully aware of the drawback of their present governi
ng mode.
The Constitutional Convention, as Hamilton expected, turned out to be a revo
lutionary change---it is not simply to revise the Articles but to replace it
by federation. Under the new form of republican government, the nation adop
ted a checks-and-balances system among legislative, judicial and executive b
ranches, which had no distinction in the Congress before. A bicameral legisl
ature that adopted by the Constitution divided the Congress into Lower House
and an upper one. Representative membership each states held in Lower House
were proportional to its population (as an important compromise, the black
population in the South was counted in but discounted by three fifth). In Up
per House, each state equally had two nominations for senate. The executive
power was placed on President, who was elected by legislature every four yea
rs and was the chief commander of American armies. He had the right to veto
the law passed by the Congress, which as well had the right to override his
veto by a two third majority. A Supreme Court was to be founded and was in c
harge of judicial branch. It had the supreme right to interpret laws and con
stitution, and to declare a law unconstitutional.
Compared with the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution strengthened t
he function of the federal government nearly in all regards, especially in t
axation and commerce regulation. What's more, this document made a new layou
t of the authority distinction to ensure the efficient operation of new gove
rnment. This checks-and-balances principle prevented any branch of the feder
al government from getting too powerful.
However, in ratification campaign, the toughest part for Federalists' lobbyi
ng was not to persuade people that the federal government could do a better
job than the dysfunctional Confederation government. The hardest task was to
talk them out of the pervasive prejudice against centralized government. In
other words, it was difficult to make people believe that the fear of tyran
ny, as James Madison concluded, should not be an overpowering constraint aga
inst a powerful national government.
Anti-Federalists, including some famous people like Patrick Henry, Samuel Ad
ams, Richard Henry Lee, seemed to have stronger arguments there. They warned
people against the elitism they saw in the Constitution. They predicted tha
t once the Constitution got ratified, the elitist minority would rule the na
tion in a dictatorial way and inevitably breach the republican principle of
liberty and democracy, which was the fruit the nation sacrificed life and bl
ood to struggle for and to preserve during the Revolution. They argued that
a republic government should keep simple and the layout of power division in
such a Constitution would not prevent the abuse of power. The elite would b
enefit from such a system and the common would suffer. And the elite minorit
y, as Anti-Federalists warned, would then get embroiled in partisan struggle
s after they assumed the ruling power.
Federalists insisted that despotism could be avoided if internal checks and
balances were built into the government's republican structure. They believe
d that governmental power did not necessarily equal to the enemy of the libe
rty but its guarantor. They did mot deny the possibility of unchecked power,
but they more denounced an unstable government. As Hamilton wrote in Federa
list No.26, "It's far better to hazard the abuse of confidence than to embar
rass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restriction
of …authority." They embraced the idea of nationhood and held that an ener
getic and prosperous "republican empire" should be led by elite, who constit
uted of men of wealth and talent, rather than by the common and mediocre fol
ks. As to “factionalism” accused by the Anti-Federalists, they explained t
hat, healthy struggle between parties was nothing but the concrete embodimen
t of checks-and-balances. To disperse common people's worries about a powerf
ul government, they also pledged to add a federal "bill of rights" to the Co
nstitution. Some basic rights the Anti-Federalists accused the Constitution
of lacking, such as freedom of worship, speech, press and peaceful assembly,
were reaffirmed and protected in the First Amendment.
Federalists got the final victory in the struggle for ratification. However,
it is not to say that they succeeded in persuading Anti-Federalists. After
all, in some politically important states, like Massachusetts, Virginia, New
York, the "'For" and "Against" votes were quite close. There was still grea
t controversy over the issue of federalism and confederationism. What's more
, behind the apparent reconciliation of some states, there lay a consensus f
or merchant interest, rather than for republican ideology. All of these stor
ed a potential hazard for the split of the nation and could not be settled u
ntil the Civil War.
Looking back to the history, America was really lucky in this fateful trial.
The so-called "Critical Period" was the continuance of the unfinished Revol
ution; the latter demolished the old regimen, the former generated a new ide
ology. Economic depression and diplomatic impasse were but the apparent dres
sing of the Critical Period. The life-and-death matter that put the republic
at stake was the nation's absence of nationhood and the undercurrent of sep
aratism. Many people felt concerned for the superficial crisis but gave no s
ight to the deeper one. Federalists showed the earliest awareness of the sit
uation and reasoned the necessity of adopting federalism by highlighting the
civil turmoil.
Though many self-interested factors were interwoven in the Convention for st
riking a deal, the Constitution of 1787 was a hallmark in the development of
republicanism. This great experimentation broke through the stereotyped fea
r of American people for central power and made the enforcement of republica
nism in a vast country possible. The United States neither returned to the o
utdated Greek Republic Mode, nor throned the nation a “George I”. The Crit
ical Period not only adjusted the course of the United States in the process
of modernization, but also set an apocalyptic example for its counterparts,
which would take the similar road in the coming future.
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Bibliography
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