Algorithm 版 (精华区)
发信人: ssos (存在与虚无), 信区: Algorithm
标 题: Can machine think? ------by Alan Turing(2)
发信站: 哈工大紫丁香 (2001年06月14日15:55:30 星期四), 站内信件
3 The Machine concerned in the Game
The question which we put in ?1 will not be quite definite until we have
specified what we mean by the word 'machine'. It is natural that we should wish
to permit every kind of engineering technique to be used in our machines. We
also wish to allow the possibility than an engineer or team of engineers may
construct a machine which works, but whose manner of operation cannot be
satisfactorily described by its constructors because they have applied a method
which is largely experimental. Finally, we wish to exclude from the machines
men
born in the usual manner. It is difficult to frame the definitions so as to
satisfy these three conditions. One might for instance insist that the team of
{p.436} engineers should be all of one sex, but this would not really be
satisfactory, for it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a
single cell of the skin (say) of a man. To do so would be a feat of biological
technique deserving of the very highest praise, but we would not be inclined to
regard it as a case of 'constructing a thinking machine'. This prompts us to
abandon the requirement that every kind of technique should be permitted. We
are
the more ready to do so in view of the fact that the present interest in
'thinking machines' has been aroused by a particular kind of machine, usually
called an 'electronic computer' or 'digital computer'. Following this suggest
ion
we only permit digital computers to take part in our game.
This restriction appears at first sight to be a very drastic one. I shall
attempt to show that it is not so in reality. To do this necessitates a short
account of the nature and properties of these computers.
It may also be said that this identification of machines with digital compute
rs,
like our criterion for 'thinking', will only be unsatisfactory if (contrary to
my belief), it turns out that digital computers are unable to give a good
showing in the game.
There are already a number of digital computers in working order, and it may be
asked, 'Why not try the experiment straight away? It would be easy to satisfy
the conditions of the game. A number of interrogators could be used, and
statistics compiled to show how often the right identification was given.' The
short answer is that we are not asking whether all digital computers would do
well in the game nor whether the computers at present available would do well,
but whether there are imaginable computers which would do well. But this is o
nly
the short answer. We shall see this question in a different light later.
4 Digital Computers
The idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these machi
nes
are intended to carry out any operations which could be done by a human
computer. The human computer is supposed to be following fixed rules; he has no
authority to deviate from them in any detail. We may suppose that these rules
are supplied in a book, which is altered whenever he is put on to a new job. He
has also an unlimited supply of paper on which he does his calculations. He may
also do his multiplications and additions on a 'desk machine', but this is not
important.
If we use the above explanation as a definition we shall be in {p.437} danger
of
circularity of argument. We avoid this by giving an outline of the means by
which the desired effect is achieved. A digital computer can usually be regar
ded
as consisting of three parts:
(i) Store.
(ii) Executive unit.
(iii) Control.
The store is a store of information, and corresponds to the human computer's
paper, whether this is the paper on which he does his calculations or that on
which his book of rules is printed. In so far as the human computer does
calculations in his head a part of the store will correspond to his memory.
The executive unit is the part which carries out the various individual
operations involved in a calculation. What these individual operations are will
vary from machine to machine. Usually fairly lengthy operations can be done s
uch
as 'Multiply 3540675445 by 7076345687' but in some machines only very simple
ones such as 'Write down 0' are possible.
We have mentioned that the 'book of rules' supplied to the computer is replaced
in the machine by a part of the store. It is then called the 'table of
instructions'. It is the duty of the control to see that these instructions are
obeyed correctly and in the right order. The control is so constructed that t
his
necessarily happens.
The information in the store is usually broken up into packets of moderately
small size. In one machine, for instance, a packet might consist of ten decimal
digits. Numbers are assigned to the parts of the store in which the various
packets of information are stored, in some systematic manner. A typical
instruction might say:
'Add the number stored in position 6809 to that in 4302 and put the result
back into the latter storage position.'
Needless to say it would not occur in the machine expressed in English. It wo
uld
more likely be coded in a form such as 6809430217. Here 17 says which of vari
ous
possible operations is to be performed on the two numbers. In this case the
operation is that described above, viz. 'Add the number. . . .' It will be
noticed that the instruction takes up 10 digits and so forms one packet of
information, very conveniently. The control will normally take the instructions
to be obeyed in the order of the positions in which they are stored, but
occasionally an instruction such as
{p.438} 'Now obey the instruction stored in position 5606, and continue f
rom
there'
may be encountered, or again
'If position 4505 contains 0 obey next the instruction stored in 6707,
otherwise continue straight on.'
Instructions of these latter types are very important because they make it
possible for a sequence of operations to be repeated over and over again until
some condition is fulfilled, but in doing so to obey, not fresh instructions on
each repetition, but the same ones over and over again. To take a domestic
analogy: suppose Mother wants Tommy to call at the cobbler's every morning on
his way to school to see if her shoes are done, she can ask him afresh every
morning. Alternatively she can stick up a notice once and for all in the hall
which he will see when he leaves for school and which tells him to call for the
shoes, and also to destroy the notice when he comes back if he has the shoes
with him.
The reader must accept it as a fact that digital computers can be constructed,
and indeed have been constructed, according to the principles we have describ
ed,
and that they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer very closely.
The book of rules which we have described our human computer as using is of
course a convenient fiction. Actual human computers really remember what they
have got to do. If one wants to make a machine mimic the behaviour of the human
computer in some complex operation one has to ask him how it is done, and then
translate the answer into the form of an instruction table. Constructing
instruction tables is usually described as 'programming'. To 'programme a
machine to carry out the operation A' means to put the appropriate instruction
table into the machine so that it will do A.
An interesting variant on the idea of a digital computer is a 'digital computer
with a random element'. These have instructions involving the throwing of a die
or some equivalent electronic process; one such instruction might for instance
be, 'Throw the die and put the resulting number into store 1000'. Sometimes s
uch
a machine is described as having free will (though I would not use this phrase
myself). It is not normally possible to determine from observing a machine
whether it has a random element, for a similar effect can be produced by such
devices as making the choices depend on the digits of the decimal for pi.
Most actual digital computers have only a finite store. There is no theoretical
difficulty in the idea of a computer with an unlimited store. Of course only a
finite part can have been used at any one time. Likewise only a finite amount
can have been {p.439} constructed, but we can imagine more and more being added
as required. Such computers have special theoretical interest and will be cal
led
infinitive capacity computers.
The idea of a digital computer is an old one. Charles Babbage, Lucasian
Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge from 1828 to 1839, planned such a machi
ne,
called the Analytical Engine, but it was never completed. Although Babbage had
all the essential ideas, his machine was not at that time such a very attract
ive
prospect. The speed which would have been available would be definitely faster
than a human computer but something like 100 times slower than the Manchester
machine, itself one of the slower of the modern machines. The storage was to be
purely mechanical, using wheels and cards.
The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will
help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the
fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that the nervous system
also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all
digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this use of electric
ity
cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course electricity usually comes in
where fast signalling is concerned, so that it is not surprising that we find
it
in both these connections. In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at le
ast
as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage system is mainly
acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a very
superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we should look
rather for mathematical analogies of function.
--
<<社会契约论>>是一本好书,应当多读几遍
风味的肘子味道不错,我还想再吃它
※ 来源:·哈工大紫丁香 bbs.hit.edu.cn·[FROM: 202.118.230.220]
Powered by KBS BBS 2.0 (http://dev.kcn.cn)
页面执行时间:3.570毫秒