精华区文章阅读

发信人: Christy (风中的绿叶), 信区: English
标  题: "Pax" Britannica or Nova "Pax" Romana? Welco...(转载)
发信站: 哈工大紫丁香 (2001年10月29日12:44:47 星期一), 站内信件

【以下文字转载自 Wisdom 讨论区】
【原文由 Christy 所发表】

         "Pax" Britannica or Nova "Pax" Romana? Welcome back anyway

                                                           BY Terry Boardman

100 years ago the world's leading superstate - Britain - was fighting to
oppose its will halfway round the world on the Boers of South Africa, a
wretched people which it saw as obscurantist, backward, and intolerant,
but who were putting up surprisingly strong resistance; it took the
British 3 embarrassing years to conquer them. Behind the struggle -
dressed up by the British as a  struggle for the rights of oppressed
English-speaking folk in South Africa, lay the will to control the gold
and diamonds of that country. They have controlled them ever since.
Today, behind all the righteous bluster about justice for the victims of
Sept 11th and rights for Afghan women, there lies the will to control
the vast oil and mineral reserves of central Asia. America is determined
to control them for the foreseeable future (see Zbigniew Brzezinski's
1997 book "The Grand Chessboard"). Imperialism was the dominant western
political  philosophy 100 years ago; the word seems to be coming back
into vogue among those British media commentators who write for media
organs close to transatlantic elite circles.
Terry
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2001/10/28/stiusausa03001.html??
October 28 2001    TERRORISM
Nation states are failing to settle the world's differences, but a new
kind of imperialism can do it,
says Robert Cooper
Dawn chorus for the new age of empire
Imperialism, empire, imperial: at worst these words have become a form
of abuse; at best they
sound merely old-fashioned. Empire, it seems, is history; indeed almost
all that we know of
history from the ancient Sumerians and Egyptians to the almost total
disappearance of empires
which followed the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian and
Ottoman empires in
the first world war.
Woodrow Wilson's 14 points after that war established the principle of
national self-determination
and created a band of nation states instead of empires. A great burst of
decolonisation followed
the defeats of Britain, France and the Netherlands by Japan in the
second world war and
removed their eastern empires.
African decolonisation followed as self-determination caught on abroad
and the costs of empire
grew at home. Finally, in 1989, the end of the cold war brought the
collapse of the Soviet Union's
external empire, followed shortly by the end of Russia's internal
empire.
So the world of empires that dates back as far as we can remember, and
which was thriving in
1900 has, 100 years later, become a world of nation states. Compared
with empire, the nation
state is a new concept; the small state began to emerge with the
Renaissance and became a
big political factor only in the 19th century. The non-existence of
empire, however, is historically
without precedent.
The question is whether this can last. The nation state has proved a
powerful engine for growth
and modernisation, but that does not make it a good basis on which to
organise the world. If
nations were fixed, like geographical features, we could draw a map of
the world that neatly
divided people into nation states. Unfortunately, nations are not like
that. "Now we have created
Italy," said Cavour after he had driven out the Austrians, "next we must
create Italians."
Are the Irish one nation or two? Are the Bretons and Basques, the
Catalans, the cockneys,
nations? Are the Arab people a nation? How many nations are there in
South Africa? The
examples are endless but the conclusion is clear: the nation is often
the creation of the state
(especially of the ministry of education).
If the nation is created by the state, then we cannot say that states
should be defined by nations.
The consequences of this circularity are becoming apparent as more and
more groups decide
they would like to break away and form new states; ethnic and linguistic
groups do not always
exist in neat geographical packages.
Nation states almost always contain minorities. A state that is based on
nationality and national
identity has a natural tendency to exclude minorities. Taken to its
hideous conclusion, it will try to
eliminate them.
Why should the minorities not be granted self-determination, since the
nation state makes clear
that they do not really belong to it?
Most people dislike governments; it may not therefore be difficult to
convince them that they
would be better off with a different government in a different state -
something closer to them and
to their ethnic identity. And the politicians promoting the cause have
everything to gain: a chance
to go down in history as fathers of the nation, the prospect of running
things for themselves, a
chance to pose on the world stage; and at the United Nations you are -
in theory - the equal of the
United States. What is there to stop the creation of an ever greater
number of smaller states?
Paradoxically, growing economic integration makes political
disintegration easier. In the days of
national economies and protective tariffs, it was important to be big.
But in a borderless world,
what difference does it make? Fifty-one states signed the UN charter in
1945; today it has 189
members. It will be surprising if we do not see more in the next 50
years.
The practical problem with a world of nation states is that many of the
post-colonial states are
weak, politically and economically. Some of these states - especially in
Africa - are near
collapse.
In the past, the solution would have been colonisation. But today there
are no colonial powers
willing to take on the job: collapsing states are awash with guns, law
and order breaks down and
government begins to resemble organised crime. The weak states of the
post-imperial world are
disastrous for those who live in them and are bad for the rest of us.
There is no need to dwell
here on the mutilations in Sierra Leone, the oppression of women and
others in Afghanistan or
the genocidal violence in the Balkans. These states are risky for
investors and for their
neighbours.
All the conditions seem to be there for a new imperialism. There are
countries that need an
outside force to create stability (recently in Sierra Leone a rally
called for the return of British
rule). And though there are fewer missionaries today there is a new
class of imperial auxiliaries
in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) preaching human
rights - the secular
religion of today's world.
If the rich took over the world when they were only three times richer
than the poor, why do they
not do so again when they are 86 times richer? The answer is that the
very ideas that have made
them rich - free exchange, free speech and the rule of law - are anti-
imperialist. In a world of human rights a new imperialism will have to
be very different from the
old. Perhaps we can begin to discern its outlines. It has two forms: the
imperialism of
globalisation and the imperialism of neighbours. Both are voluntary.
The classic writers on imperialism - Lenin, Schumpeter, Hobson -
associated it with economic
interests. Either trade followed the flag or the flag followed trade, or
both. So it is no surprise that
in a global economy there are global institutions that make the world
safe for investment. And
since we live in a post-imperial age, the control they exercise is
light, temporary and voluntary.
Nevertheless, empire is still about control. It involves control, above
all, over domestic affairs.
The conditions that the International Monetary Fund sets for its loans
are almost all about
domestic economic and political management. In return for accepting
these conditions, states in
danger of dropping out of the global economy receive help, not just from
the IMF but also from
rich governments and Wall Street. These days, aid programmes are less
often about dams and
roads, instead it is recognised that having a good government and
administration is essential to
progress.
Today's imperial intervention is also limited in time and in extent.
Since it is voluntary, perhaps it
is wrong to call it imperialism. It represents not so much a loss of
sovereignty as a temporary
loan of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the relationships are similar to
those of empire: it is a
relationship between strong and weak and it is about the organisation of
domestic affairs.
The second form of the new imperialism is that of neighbours.
Mismanagement and instability in
places where your companies wish to invest money is inconvenient.
Instability in your
neighbourhood can be much more serious. On the European Union's eastern
borders are a
large number of recently decolonised states. Many are making progress,
but anyone who wants
to see the risk of weak nation states has only to look at the Balkans.
Here, for the past 10 years,
we have seen a mixture of misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime that
not only offends the
conscience of the rich but also brings costs for the stable parts of
Europe. The Balkans are on
the transit route for drugs and a centre for people-smuggling.
Violence reached its extremity in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which are
now effectively UN
protectorates. In each case, there is a UN high representative who has
more or less
plenipotentiary powers. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps those
countries running and
most of the soldiers. In a further unprecedented move, the EU has
offered unilateral free-market
access to the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
It is not just soldiers that come from the international community, it
is also policemen, judges,
prison officers, central bankers and others. Local police are financed
by the UN. As auxiliaries to
this effort are more than 100 NGOs.
In the rest of the area to its east, the EU is engaged in a programme
that will lead to massive
enlargement. Every country between Vienna and Moscow wants to join the
EU and Nato. To do
this they are rewriting their laws and constitutions. The EU
negotiations cover agriculture,
industry, transport, environment, competition policy, monetary policy,
foreign affairs and much
else.
In the past, empires have imposed their laws and systems of government.
In this case, a
voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. The countries
concerned are not unstable
but, without the objective of EU membership and the support they have
received from that union,
some of them might have been at risk. It is probably good, on balance,
that a set of western rules
and norms is available off the peg.
While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is
given - as subject
countries once did. But the prize is that, once you are inside, you will
have a voice. If the process
is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be described as
co-operative empire.
"Commonwealth" might not be a bad name.
Many parts of Europe have lived longer and more happily in an imperial
framework than as nation
states. The Balkans with its patchwork of ethnicities has known little
else. Admittedly the imperial
periods were associated with decayed and rigid aristocratic regimes; and
the nation states that
swept them away brought modernisation, dynamism and democracy. But the
clarity and vigour
of the nation state also brought bloodshed - both in wars among
themselves and in the way they
handled their minorities. Armenians, Albanians and Kurds lived more
safely in the Ottoman
empire than in its more modern successors.
In those times, the empire could sometimes function as a third party,
above the ethnic groups
and keeping the peace between them. Today that role belongs to the
international community.
Conceived as a state, the EU is not merely unattractive, it is
unworkable. But as a co-operative
empire, a commonwealth in which each has a share in the government, no
single country
dominates and the governing principles are not ethnic but legal: it
might just work.
The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the "imperial
bureaucracy" must be
under control, accountable and the servant of the commonwealth. Such an
institution must be as
dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome,
this Europe would
provide its citizens with some laws, some coins and the occasional road.
None of this will be
easy but perhaps it is possible to imagine a future Europe, with 30 or
so members, as a
modernised, democratic, co-operative empire offering a road to peace and
the possibility of
assimilation in a common liberty. It is, at the least, a noble dream.
Robert Cooper is an adviser to the government on Afghanistan, the views
expressed are his own
and do not reflect government policy. The complete article can be found
at
www.prospect-magazine.co.uk
Copyright 2001 Times Newspapers Ltd.
----------------------------------------------------------
http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=99847
Philip Hensher: Let's be honest: we need to impose our
imperial rule on Afghanistan
'Afghans would benefit from the imposition of our cultural, political
and even religious
values'
17 October 2001
Some political terms have acquired such demonic associations that no
mainstream politician is
prepared to use them. No parliamentary politician would identify himself
or a colleague of his as a
fascist or a racist; few would venture even as far as socialist or
nationalist. There are durable
ideas we shrink from calling by their proper names.
Listening to the Prime Minister's remarkable speeches on the subject of
Afghanistan, one
reflected that imperialism has, perhaps, been buried somewhat
prematurely. The political will to
set things right in faraway places (Rwanda?) was in his conference
speech in abundance. All
that was missing, which would have followed the Prime Minister's line of
thought quite naturally,
was a commitment to move in and rule there.
The expansionist confidence of the sentiments is a surprising revival.
We thought imperialism,
and the great adventure of the British Empire, came to an end with the
abandonment of Hong
Kong. Imperialism, now, has a terrible reputation; it means the Amritsar
massacre, and the
Belgians in the Congo, asset-stripping and mass murder. It does not mean
the Roman Empire,
or the Muslims in Spain, or the Mughals in India. What Blair's speech
demonstrated was that the
idealistic sentiments that drove imperialism have not vanished. There
was nothing in it which
Clive, or Kipling, or Curzon, would have quibbled with.
Now, it is couched in terms of a United Nations government, but let us
be clear what we are
talking about: imperialism. To be honest, in this case I think it might
not be such a bad idea.
What drove imperialism, and, specifically, the British Empire? They are
very much the same
motives that may be assumed to be driving Western governments in search
of an answer to the
Afghan question. Not asset-stripping ?that was never the case for the
British ?but a wish for new
markets. Perhaps the idea that one day we could build an export market
in part of central Asia
that owed a special loyalty to us should now be driving us on.
Moral superiority, then, that manifested itself in a missionary zeal
that may have intruded on local
faiths, but which, in India, also put a stop to thuggee and suttee. Now,
our zeal is on behalf of
democracy and justice. And there is a final point that drove the Empire,
which is still with us; the
deep-grained love for and fascination with cultures not our own. Tony
Blair talks of respect for
Islam, and multiculturalism, but the spirit ?the obsession with
learning from the subject peoples ?is undiminished.
Imperialism has become a sort of metaphorical description of political
behaviour. There are no
real empires any longer. The political and cultural power of America is
often described as
imperial, but that is misleading. Certainly, American culture permeates
the world in very much
the same way that British values spread in the high period of the
Empire. Certainly, America
exerts a powerful influence over political life overseas. But it is not
comparable to a real imperial
project. The spread of McDonald's and CNN is not like the experience of
taking responsibility for
a people. A responsible imperialism ?one that set a definite term on
its rule, like the British rule
over Hong Kong ?might stand a chance of solving Afghanistan's problems.
Conceivably, the moment has come for America to pick up a responsibility
from which it has
always shrunk. At present there is no discernible will in America to
take that responsibility up; it
seems to stop at "1. Bomb them. 2. Try to make them love us with food
parcels. 3. Sell them
Coca-Cola!" I frankly don't believe that is a strategy with any chance
of success.
Of course, an imperialist rule is a fantastic, incredible proposal.
America has no stomach for,
and no experience in, such a thing. We have the experience, but I doubt
we would have the nerve
?I mean, how on earth would we ever explain it to all those professors
of post-colonial literature?
We would face, too, the task of trying to persuade the Islamic world of
the merits of such a state
of affairs.
Still, Blair's speech to the party conference only needed a final
paragraph, and he would have
been proposing this very thing ?and I suspect, perhaps misguidedly,
that he is someone who
wants to do the right thing, and not just the popular one.
The British believed from the start that their rule in India represented
an improvement in the lot of
ordinary Indians, and, on the whole, I think they were right. It might
even be argued that the
current state of affairs in Afghanistan arises from their success over
the years in fighting
colonisers off; if they had been subjugated as India was, investment and
the exchange of ideas
might have produced a tradition of parliamentary democracy and some kind
of substantial
infrastructure.
The Prime Minister is within an ace of saying that life, for the
ordinary Afghan, would be better
under our rule than it is under the Taliban, and who could disagree with
that? We are still talking
in terms of puppet rulers whose survival depends on our continuing
approval. Our instincts are to
impose our values on Afghanistan, and, while I have no doubt at all that
the ordinary Afghan
would benefit to a colossal degree from the imposition of our cultural,
political and even religious
values, I struggle to see who among the warring factions there agrees
with, or could bring about
the result we are openly seeking. The Northern Alliance, let's face it,
does not bear any very
marked resemblance to the Liberal Democrats.
For years now I've been plugging away at the theory that the Taliban are
the only internal force
who could bring any kind of stability to Afghanistan, and that some
dialogue and offers of aid
might work wonders. I wrote, too, as long ago as March this year that
the isolation of the Taliban
would lead to "acts of brutality to make the destruction of the Bamiyan
statues shrink into
insignificance". I hate to be proved right in this fashion, but at this
point, really, forget it; they have
been offered a plausible escape clause, and have stuck like lemmings
with Osama bin Laden.
Their talk of a trial in an "Islamic court" just reveals their naivety:
they sound like village mullahs,
passing judgement in a dispute between goatherds.
Stuff the Taliban; stuff an internal solution. I have a still more
radical suggestion, which sounds
bizarre but is entirely consonant with the tone of the Prime Minister's
speeches: a viceroy.

--
屈原既黜，披发行吟泽畔，颜色憔悴，形容枯槁。渔父见而问之曰：“子非
三闾大夫耶？何以至此？”屈原曰：“举世浑浊而我独清，众人皆醉而我独
醒，是以见放。”渔父曰：“吾闻夫圣人者，不凝滞于物，而与世推移。举
世浑浊，何不逐其流而荡其波；众人皆醉，何不哺其糟而啜其螭，何故怀瑾
握瑜，而自令见放为？”屈原曰：“吾闻新沐者必弹冠，新浴者必振衣。人
又能向之察察，而受物之汶汶者乎？"......�

※ 来源:·哈工大紫丁香 bbs.hit.edu.cn·[FROM: 天外飞仙]
--
※ 转载:．哈工大紫丁香 bbs.hit.edu.cn．[FROM: 天外飞仙]

English 版 (精华区)