Math 版 (精华区)
发信人: atong (sut), 信区: Math
标 题: Hilbert的Mathematical Problems演讲前半部5
发信站: 哈工大紫丁香 (2003年05月06日16:45:28 星期二), 站内信件
It remains to discuss briefly what general requirements may be justly laid
down for the solution of a mathematical problem. I should say first of all,
this: that it shall be possible to establish the correctness of the solution
by means of a finite number of steps based upon a finite number of hypotheses
which are implied in the statement of the problem and which must always be
exactly formulated. This requirement of logical deduction by means of a
finite number of processes is simply the requirement of rigor in reasoning.
Indeed the requirement of rigor, which has become proverbial in mathematics,
corresponds to a universal philosophical necessity of our understanding; and,
on the other hand, only by satisfying this requirement do the thought content
and the suggestiveness of the problem attain their full effect. A new
problem, especially when it comes from the world of outer experience, is like
a young twig, which thrives and bears fruit only when it is grafted carefully
and in accordance with strict horticultural rules upon the old stem, the
established achievements of our mathematical science.
Besides it is an error to believe that rigor in the proof is the enemy of
simplicity. On the contrary we find it confirmed by numerous examples that
the rigorous method is at the same time the simpler and the more easily
comprehended. The very effort for rigor forces us to find out simpler methods
of proof. It also frequently leads the way to methods which are more capable
of development than the old methods of less rigor. Thus the theory of
algebraic curves experienced a considerable simplification and attained
greater unity by means of the more rigorous function-theoretical methods and
the consistent introduction of transcendental devices. Further, the proof
that the power series permits the application of the four elementary
arithmetical operations as well as the term by term differentiation and
integration, and the recognition of the utility of the power series depending
upon this proof contributed materially to the simplification of all analysis,
particularly of the theory of elimination and the theory of differential
equations, and also of the existence proofs demanded in those theories. But
the most striking example for my statement is the calculus of variations. The
treatment of the first and second variations of definite integrals required
in part extremely complicated calculations, and the processes applied by the
old mathematicians had not the needful rigor. Weierstrass showed us the way
to a new and sure foundation of the calculus of variations. By the examples
of the simple and double integral I will show briefly, at the close of my
lecture, how this way leads at once to a surprising simplification of the
calculus of variations. For in the demonstration of the necessary and
sufficient criteria for the occurrence of a maximum and minimum, the
calculation of the second variation and in part, indeed, the wearisome
reasoning connected with the first variation may be completely dispensed with—
to say nothing of the advance which is involved in the removal of the
restriction to variations for which the differential coefficients of the
function vary but slightly.
While insisting on rigor in the proof as a requirement for a perfect solution
of a problem, I should like, on the other hand, to oppose the opinion that
only the concepts of analysis, or even those of arithmetic alone, are
susceptible of a fully rigorous treatment. This opinion, occasionally
advocated by eminent men, I consider entirely erroneous. Such a one-sided
interpretation of the requirement of rigor would soon lead to the ignoring of
all concepts arising from geometry, mechanics and physics, to a stoppage of
the flow of new material from the outside world, and finally, indeed, as a
last consequence, to the rejection of the ideas of the continuum and of the
irrational number. But what an important nerve, vital to mathematical
science, would be cut by the extirpation of geometry and mathematical
physics! On the contrary I think that wherever, from the side of the theory
of knowledge or in geometry, or from the theories of natural or physical
science, mathematical ideas come up, the problem arises for mathematical
science to investigate the principles underlying these ideas and so to
establish them upon a simple and complete system of axioms, that the
exactness of the new ideas and their applicability to deduction shall be in
no respect inferior to those of the old arithmetical concepts.
To new concepts correspond, necessarily, new signs. These we choose in such a
way that they remind us of the phenomena which were the occasion for the
formation of the new concepts. So the geometrical figures are signs or
mnemonic symbols of space intuition and are used as such by all
mathematicians. Who does not always use along with the double inequality a >
b > c the picture of three points following one another on a straight line as
the geometrical picture of the idea "between"? Who does not make use of
drawings of segments and rectangles enclosed in one another, when it is
required to prove with perfect rigor a difficult theorem on the continuity of
functions or the existence of points of condensation? Who could dispense with
the figure of the triangle, the circle with its center, or with the cross of
three perpendicular axes? Or who would give up the representation of the
vector field, or the picture of a family of curves or surfaces with its
envelope which plays so important a part in differential geometry, in the
theory of differential equations, in the foundation of the calculus of
variations and in other purely mathematical sciences?
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